INDCs - what are they and do they work?

Christiana Figueres thoughts on the INDCs, Source, Twitter.

The Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) mark a change of tack in approaches to tackling climate change, utilising a bottom a bottom up approach in addition to top down governance (click here for debate on bottom up/top down approaches), in which countries put forward their pledges in the context of their own national circumstances, capabilities and priorities to reduce climate change.

146 countries representing 86% of the world's carbon emissions filed pledges (UNFCCC, 2015) in the lead up to Paris basically saying what they were willing to do straight up, before the negotiations. The plans represent a significant advance on current trends with much to positive about. One of the most significant findings is that according to the UNFCCC the INDCs will bring average emissions per capita down by as much as 8% in 2025 and 9% by 2030. Furthermore they have the capability of limiting temperature rise to around 2.7 °C by 2100. Other positive findings in the UNFCCC synthesis report (2015) highlight how:

•  The INDCs indicate a significant increase in the number of countries taking climate action
• National processes put in place to prepare the INDCs helped place climate change high on the political agenda of many governments and created a new and significant momentum for action
• Somewhat significantly, the majority of the INDCs also included an adaption component demonstrating the imperative to adapt alongside efforts to reduce greenhouse gases. Past critiques of top down approaches have cited a lack of adaption.

Yet as highlighted in a Nature special the INDCs are still some way off reaching the 2 degree target. The IEA special briefing for COP21 found that the pledges would still result in a increase of 3.7 gigatonnes of CO2 from 2014 to 2030. By 2030 the annual growth in energy related emissions worldwide will slow to just 0.5% a year. Yet they will still be substantial, and will not have come to a halt - "a critical and urgent milestone to achieving the global climate goal". 

Furthermore, the think tank Climate Interactive argues that if no further action is taken after the end of the countries pledge period of 2030 will still result in expected warming in 2100 of 3.5 °C (fig. 1) (with a range of uncertainty of 2.0-4.6 °C). Furthermore, Joe Romm the author of a highly accredited blog argues that the UNFCCC press release above is in fact a little bit misleading in its use of its 2.7°C by 2100 statistic, successfully misleading the Guardian in a recent article. The majority of the INDC pledges end by 2030 so a 2.7 °C temperature change prediction is based on the rather large assumption that countries fulfill all their pledges up to 2030 and then continue to reduce emissions after 2030. The INDCs no longer seem so rosy.  However, if further action is taken these figures could improve. There are large unknowns. Yet the the 3.5 °C calculation does assume that no unmodeled carbon cycle feedback kicks in such as permafrost melting (Romm 2015).

The Climate Interactive scoreboard, Source Climate Interactive.

However, on balance I agree with Christiana Figueres, executive director of the UNFCCC when she argues that although the INDCs do not lower future temperatures enough they are significant improvement on the warming predicted by the IPCC. It would be somewhat naive to expect the INDCs to solve all the climate problems straight away. Figueres has stressed that the INDCs are just the first step. They are only relevant over the medium term and were never going to reach 2 degrees by themselves. The are "a departure point and not a destination, the Paris agreement will construct a path of ever-increasing emission reductions with periodic checkpoints of progress until we get to the 2 degree pathway" Figueres (2015). There are also hopes that a regular review mechanism will also be agreed in Paris, by which the INDCs could be ratcheted up in further steps providing a foundation for higher ambition. 

As the conclusion of the synthesis report reminds us "parties have submitted their INDCs with the understanding that they would be anchored in a broader new climate agreement that would support sustainable actions nationally and globally". We can but hope that this really happens in Paris over the next two weeks.

Global climate marches: Powerful, Inspiring and creating a sense of hope.

The London Climate March, Source: own photo.

I have just got back from the Climate March in London on the Eve of COP21 and what an experience. According to organisers a record-breaking 50,000 people attended in London, almost double last years London Climate March. 

I attended the march (my first) and found the experience powerful and inspiring.  Somewhat surprisingly it also filled me with a sense of hope. With 50,000 people marching alongside you calling for change it gave me a sense that climate is moving up our agendas and an agreement may be realised in Paris. As I have seen described elsewhere, it gave me that goose bump feeling. I met the march half way through at Trafalgar square and watched people go by for over fifteen minutes but there was still no impression that it would ever end. From then we walked as part of the crowds down Whitehall to Parliament square with people of all ages and from all over the world - surely a sign of solidarity on the streets of London. World leaders are you listening? The march was completely peaceful, respectful and friendly and very well organised. A massive thank you should go out to the organisers, volunteers and police.

The London Climate March, Source: own Photo.

Climate Marches began hours before in Australia moving east to west with 45,000 marchers in Sydney, 3,000 in the Philippines, 5,000 in Bangladesh, 20,000 in Madrid and Rome to name a few and the Americas still to come. In Paris, where protests were banned following the Paris attacks thousands of pairs of shoes have been left in the Place de la Republique as an instillation, including a pair of the Popes! A peaceful human chain was also created with 10,000 people holding hands in a human line over 3km stretching the originally proposed march route in Paris.

Source: David Shukman, Twitter.

Source: Jamie Henn, Twitter.

However, it appears as ever that a few make it their priority to undermine the peaceful climate marches of hundreds of thousands. Reports on the Guardian Live page claim that the day of peaceful, respectful and highly moving protests in Paris disintegrated into a stand off between groups of anarchist protesters and riot police, with police using tear gas to clear the area. Incredibly sad making is that according to another reporter many of the flowers and candles left in tribute to the 130 people who died in the attacks have been trampled on and destroyed. How disrespectful and distant from what the climate marches are about. No wonder 350.org the global march organiser has distanced itself from the violent protests. I cannot also help but feel that there is also a focus on the negative minority rather than the positive, peaceful and hopeful majority.

One of my favorite stories emerging from Paris is the 'Brandalism' campaign with more than 600 artworks critiquing corporate sponsors of the UN summit installed in advertising spaces across Paris, including some politicians too! - click here to see more. 

For a great gallery of the climate marches across the globe click here. Closer to home even the BT tower is getting involved!! Next couple of Blogs are on the INDCs and a final pre-summit synopsis.

Source: BT Better Future, Twitter.

Some videos!

So in a bit of a break from all my recent long blog posts on the history of climate change negotiations and on the debate between top down and bottom up approaches here are two videos which I have since found which explain the topics in a different light and outline some similar arguments (phew!).

Enjoy! 

A history of climate change negotiations:

The Paris Climate Conference explained.

'Top down' or 'bottom up' - different discourses on tackling climate change. Part 2.

So what should it be? Top down or bottom up or can you do both?
Source:Google images

For part 1 click here

Despite the arguably proven philosophy of the global deal, Falkner et al. (2010) go onto argue that the relative failures of Copenhagen demonstrate that the strategy may have outlived its usefulness, experiencing diminishing returns resulting from shifts in climate politics. Obstacles to international cooperation, include a lack of political will among major emitters with many counties lacking necessary domestic support. Previously of the five leading emitters of CO2 (China, US, EU, Russia and India) only the EU has strongly supported a legally binding agreement (although this may have changed recently - see future blog on pledges in the lead up to Paris).

Furthermore structural shifts in the international political economy also mark serious challenges for the global deal (Falkner et al. 2010). Whilst EU/US divisions used to be the main are of contention, the main divide is now between emerging and developed nations. The changing balance of power significantly strengthens the veto power of developing nations. Whilst the US at Copenhagen made its commitments dependent on those made by major emerging economies, China like may other major emerging economies demanded that industrialised countries bear a greater historical responsibility and thus should take a lead in controlling emissions, with poorer countries needing to catch up economically before heavy responsibility is placed upon them. In addition, debates also surround the effectiveness of the UN negotiation framework (Falkner et al. 2010), with two years being spent preparing for the conference, yet the negotiation texts prepared were completely ignored in the Accord. Progress was also primarily made using smaller and more exclusive negotiation groups and new multi-track diplomacy, a break from the traditional negotiation.

This so called failure of the top-down approach has led to the development of discourses arguing for a bottom-up approach to climate policy. One paper uses a simple but effective analogy to demonstrate the logic of a bottom up approach (Rayner, 2010).

Q: How do you eat an elephant

A: One Piece at a time

The paper argues that despite its dominance, an 'elegant' top down approach of legally binding targets enabled through carbon trading markets underestimates market complexities and overestimate the willingness of politicians to priorities climate change over welfare issues. It is also argued that top down approaches neglect the importance of adaption. Instead a bottom up approach:

'emphasizes the ‘direction of travel’ over targets and timetables and approaches the development of effective measures to minimize global warming through a diverse range of policy actions, originating from the ‘bottom up’ within nations, based on their own institutional, technological, economic and political capacities; but which cumulatively will lead to a fundamental technological shift in global patterns of energy and land use' (Rayner, 2010)

The bottom up approaches requires climate change policies to be designed and implemented at the lowest feasible level of organization. I.e when something can be done at lower organizational levels it should be. A bottom up approach also focuses directly on adaption which is by definition local in nature. I agree with Rayner when he argues that although adaption is by no means a substitute for mitigation it is vital for saving lives and bring immediate benefits to humanity. Arguments in favour of bottom up approaches also highlight the huge potential for cities to tackle climate change through tackling issues of energy, transport, water and spatial development. These arguments are in fact echoed by a new report by the UN which confirms crucial role of cities and companies.

A further discourse put forward as an alternative to the global deal is the 'building blocks approach'  (Falkner et al. 2010) which markets itself as closer to a global deal strategy than a pure bottom up approach, with the long-term objective of an integrated policy regime, yet disregards with 'a dose of political realism'the idea of a legally binding treaty. Furthermore, despite distancing itself from the bottom up approach it has many similarities. The building block approach:

'disaggregates global climate governance into component parts that can be developed in a more flexible manner, involving different sets of negotiations based on varying political geometries and regime types...Rather than wait for a single agreement to cover all governance mechanisms, individual agreements are developed on matters such as technology innovation and diffusion, adaptation funding, deforestation and sectoral approaches for industrial sectors'.

In my opinion a lot can be learnt from the bottom up approach, there are clearly flaws in pursuing a top down approach, which is clearly creating diminishing returns for climate governance. Yet, I am also concerned by the true ability of a bottom up approach to promote change, with its 'modest and practical approach' (Rayner, 2010). I am concerned that completely abandoning an integrated climate regime, or top down approach and focusing solely on bottom up approaches removes the stimulus for developing ambitious domestic policies, enhancing the lowest common denominator (Falkner et al. 2010), as well as potentially loosing the other benefits of a global strategy outlined previously.

To me, it seems illogical to completely abandon a top down system that as been at the forefront of negotiations for a new system that is unproven and no more guaranteed to ensure success. Climate change is a global problem and requires a global response. Yet the top down approach does require modification. It seems logical instead to pursue a legally binding global deal that also combines and purses elements of both bottom up and building block approaches creating a complex regime with integrated management. Why should each approach be exclusive of one another. Surely combing the most effective elements covers all basis and maximizes the chances of climate change being tackled effectively. Such an approach in fact appears to be emerging in the lead up to the COP21. The climate talks are still pursuing a new international agreement on climate and top down approaches will be used to manage the new Green Climate Fund and the $100 billion dollars a year by 2020 pledged to help developing countries cope with climate change. However, the INDCs agreed in Lima as part of a new approach mark the combination of top down systems with  a bottom-up approach in which countries put forward their agreements in the context of their own national circumstances, capabilities and priorities to reduce climate change. How successful this new approach is still up for debate. However, my next blogs aims to answer this by analysing this new approach along with the other initiatives that have been intended to spur action on in the run-up to Paris. 

'Top down' or 'bottom up' - different discourses on tackling climate change. Part 1.

The top down approach: The opening conference at COP15
Source: Wikipedia 

Regardless of whether you consider the Copenhagen conference a success or failure (see my last blog), the failure to reach even the lightest nonbinding deceleration led many to question the bleak prospects of the consensus-based UN process for responding to climate change (Dimitrov, 2010). Not only did the conference failed to reach a global climate deal but also 'laid bare the deep fissures in climate politics that make a global deal ever less likely' (Falkner et al., 2010). It has been suggested that Realpolitik became the norm in Copenhagen with promotion of national interests over the pursuit of a costly global climate solution. Does this, as Falkner et al., 2010 argue, signal the end of the global deal strategy?

Since 1992 governments of the world have pursued a strong, integrated and comprehensive regulatory framework system for managing climate change. However, Keohane et al., (2011) argues that efforts have instead created a varied array of narrowly-focused regulatory regimes which they call the "regime complex for climate change". These have been crafted in a context of diverse interests, high uncertainty, and shifting linkages. They are not integrated, comprehensive, or arranged in a clear hierarchy. Furthermore, there is no single climate change problem, each with attributes, challenges and political constituencies. These problems are associated with diverse interests, power, information and beliefs creating significant challenges for international cooperation (for greater detail see Keohane et al., 2011).

All this points towards the infeasibility of a strong comprehensive regime, underlining how challenging an international problem climate change is to manage. Yet the global deal strategy has continued to prevail in international environmental politics. Why? Falkner et al. (2010) suggests four reasons why it still remains dominant today.

1. A global legally binding treaty that contains firm and measurable commitments are more likely to be effective in securing lasting emission reductions than a system of voluntary pledges.
2. Multilateral environmental policy focused on creating a comprehensive regulatory regime has led to the growth of vital institutions that support global environmental governance (Scientific, reporting, financial aid etc.).
3. Firm commitments which form part of a legally binding deal sends strong messages to private actors throughout the economy and private sector, reducing uncertainty and enabling the reduction in transaction costs promoting proactive responses.
4. Regardless of the success of achieving a global deal, striving for such an outcome helps to maintain political momentum in international negotiations, setting high ambitions and expectations to maintain pressure for positive progress.

For part 2 click here

So what's happened before? A short history of UN climate negotiations.

Obama, Merkel Brown and Sarkozy at last minute negotiations on the final night at Copenhagen.
Will Paris end in such a last minute grasp? Photo Credit: Guardian/Getty Images 

Before analysing the initiatives (including the INDC pledges) that were intended to spur action on in the run-up to Paris, over my next two blogs I am going to outline the history of global climate governance. This will culminate in analysis of the varying approaches and  discourses on international climate policy questioning where COP21 sits within the spectrum.

The first phase of global negotiations on climate change began in force in 1992, when governments met in Rio de Janeiro successfully negotiating the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). While the convention itself did not set binding specific limits on greenhouse gas emissions for individual countries (leading to some disappointment), it recognized climate change as a serious threat and established the basis for future action. This was achieved through the defining of a common long term objective for the stabilization of greenhouse gases and outlined vital principles for future policy relating to inter/intra generational equity, common but differentiated responsibilities, precaution, cost-effectiveness, sustainable development and the international economy (Bodansky, 1993). Bodanksy argues in his highly cited paper that reaching an agreement in Rio, involving 140 states with very different interests and ideologies, in such a limited period of time was a "considerable achievement".

The UNFCCC paved the way for negotiation of a more specific protocol with binding commitments, culminating in the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This included differentiated commitments by industrialised countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by,  5 per cent of 1990 emissions by 2012. However, Kyoto had its flaws. Due to prolonged problems with obtaining enough countries to ratify the protocol, Kyoto only entered into force in 2005. Furthermore, the Protocol was also limited in scope to Annex 1 countries, excluding developing countries, and critically the United States (the largest net emitter at the time and the largest cumulative emitter to date) who failed to ratify the deal, somewhat undermining the Protocol (Falkner et al., 2010).

Furthermore, the protocols commitment period ended in 2012 meaning it was over as soon as it started, requiring further negotiations to secure a post Kyoto global deal. An action plan that set the course for a new agreement to take over from Kyoto was agreed in 2007 at Bali (after much drama). The infamous Copenhagen conference (COP15) in December 2009 was intended to be the deadline to resolve debates about the post-2012 climate regime. Key questions surrounded whether the protocol should be extended in a second commitment period, should the new agreement be adopted under the Framework convention addressing the emissions of countries that did not ratify or were not under the jurisdiction of Kyoto (developing countries). Or should Kyoto be replaced through a more comprehensive agreement, targeting both the developed and developing (Bodansky, 2010).

Although there were high expectations that the conference would mark a significant breakthrough, hopes for a full-fledged legal agreement proved unrealistic. Instead after two weeks of negotiations only a political agreement, the Copenhagen Accord could be agreed upon. The Accord was very brief, two and a half pages effectively trashing the draft texts of nearly 200 pages . One major development however was the inclusions of a the long-term goal of limiting climate change to no more than two degrees Celsius (2°C) (Dimitrov, 2010).

One other important shift in Copenhagen was the focus on developing country emissions, "representing a significant reorientation of the climate change negotiations" (Bodansky, 2010). The developed-developing country debate moved from the sidelines where it had been since the Berlin Mandate in 1995 (which excluded any new commitments from non-annex 1 countries in negotiations for Kyoto) to center stage following the Bali Conference. Developed countries argued that any post-2012 agreement should include all of the major economies, regardless of development status. Developing countries argued, somewhat understandably that they are not as historically responsible, lack the propensity to respond and thus should not be expected to  undertake specific agreements. The Accord continues to have a differentiated structure but (Bodansky, 2010) argues that it begins to break the firewall between developed and developing countries: developed countries’ are required to have economy-wide emission targets, which will be subject to international monitoring and review (MRV), whereas developing countries’ actions, which will be subject to international MRV only if a mitigation action receives outside assistance, and otherwise to national MRV. Subtle nuances but significant nonetheless.

The Accord also specified the Establishment of a mechanism for "REDD-Plus" (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) and recognized the importance of adaption in addition to mitigation in the fight against climate change.  Somewhat significantly for the developed/developing debate the conference also saw establishment of mechanisms for financial assistance including the goal of mobilizing $100 billion a year by 2020 to help countries adapt and mitigate. However, moving forward to Paris questions still remain unanswered with regards the sources of finance and what governance arrangements should be put in place (Bodansky, 2010).

Despite the progress, many commentators labelled the Copenhagen Conference a "failure whose magnitude exceeded our worst fears, and the resulting Copenhagen Accord was a desperate attempt to mask the failure"(Dimitrov, 2010). Even the accord was not formally adopted and instead "taken note of" following a coup by Bolivia, Sudan and Venezuela  raising questions (see next blog) about future prospects of the consensus-based UN approach (absence of formal objection) (Falkner et al., 2010). Since Copenhagen the development that stands out most to me is the development of INDCs, the ground rules of which were determined at COP20 in Lima. More on this next time!

Regardless of whether Copenhagen and ts predecessors were successful or failures they has paved the way for and set up Paris where it really is crunch time. What really matters is that the talks are successful. However, following the 'failures' of Copenhagen many academics began to question the future of the 'top down' UN process for responding climate change calling for 'bottom up' or 'building block approaches'. My next blog will analyse these claims in greater deal questioning whether a top down approach will ever be successful.

2°C target - Is it really enough? Or better than nothing?

Planetary health - Is a two degree target really the correct indicator and target of planetary health? 

Credit: Victor and Fennel 2014.

A comment posted on my Paris climate conference introductory blog asked whether I believed COP21 has set itself up to fail with its target to keep global warming below 2°C. This blog aims to provide an answer, questioning why 2°C been chosen as the target?

Despite the controversy of  COP15 in 2009, the Copenhagen Accord included for the first time the long-term goal of limiting the maximum global average temperature increase to no more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels putting a number on what constituted the limit for dangerous climate change. 

According to all the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessed emission scenarios, surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st century (fig.1).

Global average surface temperature change from 2006 to 2100 relative to 1986-2005.

The increase in global mean surface temperature by the end of the 21st century relative to 1986–2005 is likely to be 0.3°C to 1.7°C under RCP* 2.6, 1.1°C to 2.6°C under RCP 4.5, 1.4°C to 3.1°C under RCP 6.0 and 2.6°C to 4.8°C under RCP 8.5 (IPCC 2014). Without any additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today warming is more likely than not to exceed  4°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.

Risks from climate and temperature
range for five reasons of concern.

Five Reasons For Concern (RFCs) aggregate climate change risks and illustrate the implications of warming and of adaptation limits for people, economies and ecosystems (IPCC 2014).

Figure 2 shows these RFC's. The risks associated with temperatures at or above 4°C by the end of the century (>1000 ppm  CO₂) include substantial (very high/high) species extinction, global and regional food insecurity, consequential constraints on common human activities and limited potential for adaptation in some cases. Some risks of climate change, such as risks to unique and threatened systems and risks associated with extreme weather events, are moderate to high at temperatures 1°C to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Yet 2°C is still the target of COP21.

The IPCC have found cumulative emissions of CO₂ to largely determine global surface warming by the end of the 21st century and beyond meaning significant cuts in emissions over the short term can substantially reduce risks of climate change over the longer term.

Table 1 shows that emissions scenarios leading to CO₂ equivalent concentrations in 2100 of about 450 ppm or lower are likely to maintain warming below 2°C (IPCC). However, this requires  40 to 70% global anthropogenic GHG emission reductions by 2050 compared to 2010, and emissions levels near zero or below in 2100. Interestingly scenarios which more likely than no limit warming to 1.5°C by 2100 are characterized by concentrations below 430 parts per million (ppm) CO₂ by 2100, and 2050 emission reduction between 70% and 95% below 2010. Scenarios of greater than 1000 ppm  CO₂ make it almost impossible to limit global warming to less than 3°C.

Key characteristics of the different temperature scenarios showing the necessary emission reductions and relative likelihood. 

2°C would be a massive milestone in curbing global warming requiring dramatic reductions in green house gases. Yet, somewhat hidden by the aura of the 2°C target and shown by figure 2 is that even two degrees may be too high. As argued by climate activist David Spratt a 2°C is a "very unsafe target" marking instead the boundary between dangerous and very dangerous climate change. Even though the IPCC adopt the 2°C target these views do appear to be echoed by the IPCC findings (fig. 2). As a recent Guardian article argued, if global warming is limited to 2°C, warming will still destroy most coral reefs and glaciers and melt significant parts of the ice caps. Even under RCP 2.6 sea level is still expected to rise 0.4 (IPCC 2014). An even lower target is needed. Back in 2008 it was argued that an atmospheric CO₂ target of at most 350 ppm is required (Hansen et al), 100ppm lower than the requirement of the 2°C target. "We should therefore be striving to limit warming to as far below 2°C as possible. However, that will require a level of ambition that we have not yet seen.” (Professor Chris Field of Stanford University in Guardian article). 

Not only does the 2°C target not appear significant enough there have been calls in Nature for the target to be ditched and replaced (Victor and Fennel 2014), arguing the target is "politically and scientifically... wrongheaded". 

They argue that politically it has allowed governments to pretend they are taken action when in reality they are in fact they are achieving very little. Chasing this goal has allowed governments to ignore the need for massive adaption to climate change. I for one presumed (wrongly) that the 2 degree target specified for COP21 and repeated like a manta, cited thousands of time in newspapers, journals and even in the IPCC report was sufficient enough to limit warming. Only looking at the evidence has shown me otherwise.

Victor and Fenell also argue the target is "effectively unachievable" citing feasibility and cooperation. Again evidence supports this.  In September last year PwC issued a report arguing that there is a "disconnect between the global climate negotiations aiming for a 2°C limit on global warming, but national pledges may only manage to limit it to 3°C, and current trajectory actually on course for 4°C." This is echoed by analysis of the INDCs (climate pledges) put forward by 146 countries in the lead up to COP21 released last week which suggest that the pledges will only reduce warming to 2.7°C by 2100. However are these really reasons for why a 2°C target should be scratched? Are they not just reasons for more action?

Scientifically they suggest the basis for the 2°C goal is "tenuous" arguing that a single index of climate change is impossible calling for a set of indicators to gauge various forcing and stresses. The Planetary Boundaries framework (Steffan et al. 2015) is a clear example of such an approach assessing and defining a safe operating space for humanity based on 9 'Planetary Boundaries'. That said the 2°C is not really just single metric, it is closely linked to a multitude of risks (Schellnhuber 2014). The IPCC for instance have outlined the GHG emission reductions required to reach the target. Instead, a 2°C goal creates an easily comprehendible bench mark with more complex indicators behind it.

I agree with Victor and Fenell that a new of set of planetary indicators needs to be developed and should become the basis of climate policy - over time. As the limitations of the Planetary Boundaries Framework show such an approach is not yet ready to take the batten. I certainly do not agree that COP21 should be a technical conference developing such metrics as they suggest. Although their article sets out to tackle inaction, debating metrics just creates more distraction when COP21 really is crunch time. 

Moreover in terms of communicating the importance of a deal in Paris to the governments and public a 2°C target has much more weight. In response to the article Hans Joachim Schellnhuber (Angela Merkel's climate advisor) says "I am communicating to heads of state and you have to keep it neat and simple. It was difficult enough to commuicate a 2°C target ... but it seems to have sunk in. How should I communicate to policy makers who have an attention span of 10 minutes a set of volatility signals … this is politically so naive”. However imperfect, a target that is sinking in and generating change is better than overly complicated incomprehendible one.

I do not believe COP21 has set itself up to fail with its target to keep global warming below 2°C. The target appears to have created an understandable metric promoting people, businesses and governments to respond to climate change in a way not previously experienced. The metric is not a long term solution. A new set of internationally recognized planetary indicators should be be agreed upon, but 2°C will suffice for the time being and overall metrics will always have a role to play. However, COP21 is setting itself up to fail the planet by only providing half the answer. 2°C global warming is still too high. We must strive to limit warming as far below 2°C and this should become the focus of international climate policy. The target is not enough, but it is better than nothing.

*RCP = Representative Concentration Pathway. A set of four scenarios identified by their approximate total radiative forcing in year 2100 relative to 1750: 2.6 W m-2 for RCP2.6, 4.5 W m-2 for RCP4.5, 6.0 W m-2 for RCP6.0, and 8.5 W m-2 for RCP8.5 (IPCC 2013).